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FUNCTIONAL NONSENSE AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH
WALTER B. KENNEDYt

ITH increasing frequency and dogmatic assurance we are informed
that the law is an agglomeration and admixture of transcendental
nonsense, 1 perpetuated stupidity,2 scholastic logic,' syllogistic reasoning, 4
supernatural concepts5 and medieval theology.0 The "Jovian lawyers'"
of the classical tradition are pictured in their heavenly abode of empty
abstractions, mumbling pious principles' and uttering "solving words,"'
W

t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach (1935) 35 COL. L. Rv.
809, 821: "Jurisprudence, then, as an autonomous system of legal concepts, rules and
arguments. . . is a special branch of the science of transcendental nonsense." (Hereafter
cited: Cohen).
The italics used throughout this paper have been inserted by the writer.
2. "It [the doctrine of precedent] is a habit of mind in which a stupidity may be
perpetuated on the grounds that it is well established." Roanisox, LAW AND TE LAwYnRs
(1935) 31.
One is tempted to ask whether the risk of stupidity will be lessened by the substitution
of the whim or caprice of individualized justice. Kennedy, Men or Laws? (1932) 2
BROOKLYN L. RaV. 11, 24-25.
3. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 63-68; I-arno, Social Planning and
Perspective Through Law (1933) 7 Am¢. L. ScHooL Rv. 705, 707. RoBisoN, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 43.
Scholastic logic is the bite noire of the functionalists' attack. Like the cry of "radical"
in political parlance, one can destroy any dogma of traditional law by calling It "scholastic
logic". Citation of scholastic authorities is deemed unnecessary.
For an exposition of present-day scholasticism, see ZYBuRA, PRESENT-DAY TINKERS AND
THE NEW ScnOLAsTicism (1927); BRuNI-ZYBURA, PROGRESSVE SCUOLASxCIASM (1929).
See also Wilkinson, The Scholastic Heritage of Our Law (1936) 13 TirE MODERN SooLmN 66.

4. FRANx, op. cit. supra note 3, at 66; Cook, Legal Logic (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 108,
114; Harno, Experience, Experimentation and Logical Method (1931) 17 A. B.A. J. 659.
S. Cohen, at 821.
6. Arnold, Apologia for Jurisprudence (1935) 44 YAE L. J. 729, 737-753; Roumsox,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 38.
7. Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence (1934) 7 Am. L. School Rv. 1063, 1065.
8. Williston, Change in the Law (1935) 69 U. S. L. REv. 237; Kennedy, Principles or
Facts? (1935) 4 FoRDHAm L. REV. 53.

9. The critic cannot refrain from directing attention to the fact that "words" are
beginning to trouble the worshippers of facts quite as much as the old fashioned theoreticians. For a movement which has as one of its objectives the elimination of the "wordmagic" of conceptualism the reformers are displaying considerable difficulty in fixing upon
a suitable word for their product. Jerome Frank, after a devastating attack upon the
"verbalism" of the conceptualists, (op. cit. supra note 2, at 22-31) suggests that "realistic
jurisprudence was an unfortunate label since the word 'realism' has too many conflicting
meanings.". (Supra note 7, at 1063.) He proposes a new word, "experimental" jurisprudence. Other words are offered in competition with "realism" and are expressIva of in-
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unmindful of the facts of life and unaware of the march of science.
Grim warnings are currently issued that the law of the classical tradition
must submit to a major operation, cutting deep into the fabric of the old
order, or retire in favor of the sociological, functional, scientific, institutional, experimental and realistic schools of jurisprudence now vehemently pressing forward with their overlapping programs of reform. Emboldened by their rapid advances, they exhibit a new ferocity in recent
realistic manifestos; predictions are presently made that the age of classical law is drawing to a close; 1° the functional approach is not only
approaching-it is here; ' a new era is in the making, pregnant not
merely with the promise of progress but also with present performance.
Sur-realism'2 has arrived.
Typical of the vigor and breadth of attack against the traditional
order is a recent paper by Felix S. Cohen under the significant title,
"Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach."13 In ruthless fashion he tears apart the placid, senseless concepts of the
"theoreticians of the law" and argues for a wholesale ouster of "supernatural terms" which befog the realities of human and societal relations
and smother frank discussion behind a smoke screen of "legal nonsense."
genuity in word-coinage: functionalism, skepticism, animism, neo-realism, objective method,
fal-research and scientific approach.
The modernists after ousting the "words" of the logicians have done tolerably well in
setting up a new vocabulary to take the place of the old. Not alone in the title but in
the content of their writings the new leaders have introduced terms and words which
puzzle and confuse even the word-ridden followers of the classical law. See notes 19-29,
infra. Is it possible that in the zest of attack against the "word-magic" of the old order
the functionalists have been unwittingly building up a competitive "word-magic" of their
own? Goodrich, Our Black Ink Balance (1932) 7 Am L. SCHoOL R . 385, 395.
10. Cohen, at 833.
11. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism (1931) 44 HMv. L. RE'. 1222, 1223. "The
experimentalist attitude may have been fostered, in its inception, at Columbia and Yale
but today it is an attitude which has spread everywhere." Frank, supra note 7, at 1056.
12. The term, sur-realism, is offered as a label for the extremists of the realist movement
who display an impatience with the slow and gradual reform of the law and advocate a
"revision to the roots". See Cohen; RoBnzsox, op. cit. supra note 2; Beutel, Some Imflica,
tions of Experimental Jurisprudence (1934) 48 Harv. L. R v. 169; Frank, supra note 7.
It is interesting to observe the successive steps in the progre. of functional, realistic or
experimental jurisprudence. It began as an outgrowth of pragmatic or sociological jurisprudence. Kennedy, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law (1925) 9 MAnArQ. L. Rcv. 63;
Sabine, The PragmaticApproach to Politics (1930) 24 Air. Por. Sc. REv. 866; Aumann,
Some Changing Patterns in the Social Order (1935) 24 KM. L. J. 38. Cardozo and Pound,
torch bearers of the pragmatic approach, have now been displaced in the onrush of realism
and rather severely criticised for their lack of vision and progrein, for their adherence to
precedents and concepts. FAxa, op. cit. supra note 3, at 207, 236. For estimates of
realism by Cardozo and Pound, see Cardozo, Address before New York State Bar AssociaToror Nhw YoR STA_' BAR Ass'r (1932) 264; Pound, The Call for a
tion, 55 R
Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L. REy. 697.
13. (1935) 35 COL. L. R v. 809.
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His thesis begins with a colorful and metaphorical description of the
"heaven of legal concepts":
"Some fifty years ago a great German jurist had a curious dream. He
dreamed that he died and was taken to a special heaven preserved for the
theoreticians of the law. In this heaven one met, face to face, the many concepts of jurisprudence in their absolute purity, freed from all entangling
alliances with human life. Here were the disembodied spirits of good faith and
bad faith, property, possession, laches, and rights in rem. Here were all the
logical instruments needed to manipulate and transform these legal concepts
and thus to create and to solve the most beautiful of legal problems. Here one
found a dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an indefinite
number of meanings out of any text or statute, an apparatus for constructing
fictions, and a hair-splitting machine that could divide a single hair into
999,999 equal parts and, when operated by the most expert jurists, could split
each of these parts again into 999,999 equal parts. The boundless opportunities of this heaven of legal concepts were open to all properly qualified jurists,
provided only they drain the Lethean draught which induced forgetfulness of
terrestrial human affairs. But for the most accomplished jurists the Lethean
draught was entirely superfluous. They had nothing to forget.
"Von Jhering's dream has been retold, in recent years, in the chapels of
sociological, functional, institutional, scientific, experimental, realistic, and
neo-realistic jurisprudence. The question is raised: How much of contemporary
legal thought moves in the pure ether of Von Jhering's heaven of legal conof our courts
cepts? One turns to our leading textbooks and to the opinions
4
for answer. May the Shade of Von Jhering be our guide."'
Needless to add, this passage was "writ sarcastic" for the obvious
purpose of directing attention to the extravagant and absurd emphasis
placed upon legal concepts. In telling fashion and unique allegory Cohen
demolishes the temple of legal conceptualism. Falling victim to the picturesque imagery which guided the pens of Von Jhering and Cohen, and
in tribute to the generous gesture of functionalism which allots the full
expanse of ethereal regions to the disciples of transcendentalism, the
writer succumbs to the temptation to sketch out an opposition-"heaven"
being reared in our own day and place- a super-special, de luxe, celestial
world, strangely different from the graphic picture of the special heaven
reserved for the theoreticians of the law; a dream world quite as
wonderous and starting as the fanciful fabrication of Von Jhering.
I

THI

HEAVEN OF FUNCTIONALISIM

In this realistic heaven one meets the many facts of life, in their absolute nakedness, bared of all the vaporous abstractions, metaphysical
principles and airy concepts, so dear to the "theoreticians" of the law.
This modernistic Olympus has as its first function (principle, one must
14. Id. at 809.
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never say) the eviction of the musty absolutes of the classical tradition
and the substitution of instruments of science. Here in the Elysian fields
of functionalism one rubs against things "as is" and not things "as if"; 5
its stalwart adherents think thoughts, not words'0 and in their workshops recall that "words are daughters of men, but things are the sons
of heaven." 17 Gone are the disembodied spirits of good faith and bad
faith, property, possession, laches and rights in rem. Gone, too, are
the moth-eaten, dry-as-dust, outmoded and "bankrupt" concepts of
Corporation, Title, Contract, Due Process, Fair Value and Vested
Rights.'
These are taboo words which have been ousted from the
lexicon of the realists and a new series of fact-words, packed with the
"itness" of realism, are to be substituted. Such soothing specimens are
found as "Wousining"'1 9 nihilistic skepticism,20 institution,21 behavior2
pattern, 3 cultural lag,2 4 background,2 5 purpose,20 hunch, 7 induction,'
15. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 1236; ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 38; Cohen,
at 839.
16. Hutchinson, Judging as Administration (1934) 7 Air. L. SchooL RLv. 1069, 1072.
17. Johnson, Preface to the English Dictionary, reprinted in (1909) 39 HInv. Cm.AsSmcs
191.
18. Cohen, at 820, 821 and 823.
19. FRANx, op. cit. supra note 3, at 57.

20. Id. at 63.
21. "By institutions we merely mean collective behavior patterns, the ways in which a
community carries on the innumerable activities of social life ....
" Shepard, Democracy
in Transition (1935) 29 Ax. POL. Ser. Rv. 1; Moore, Rational Bass of Legal Institutons
(1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 609; NOYES, THE INsruTio, or PRoPrTY (1936).
22. The study of behavior is an important item in the program of the functionalists;

not what judges say, but what they do, not "words," but "behavior." The "non-vocal"
interpretation of law is found in Oliphant, A Rcturn to Stare Decisis (1928) 6 Am. L.
ScHooL Rv. 215, 229. It is closely linked with behavioristic psychology. Beutel, supra
note 12, at 175. In the arguments of the legal behaviorists we find the contention that
judicial decision is motivated by "stimuli" and "reactions" and that human action is determined by environment and may be controlled.
OLD (1934) 16-21.

Wn;GrInE-STnAr

Don,
Nnw Mmxms ron

23. Aumann, supra note 12.
24. "Cultural lag" is a favorite term expressive of the drag of legal conservatism which
holds back legal reform. RoBINson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3, 13, 325.
25. "The upshot seems to be that, within our time-limitation, we either integrate the
background of social and economic fact and policy, course by course, or fail of our job2
Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with Legal Education (1935) 35 CoL. L. RE%. 651, 671. If
Llewellyn is right in his thesis that law schools should wake up "to the job of integrating
background---social or philosophical-into every course" (p. 671), then the law schools
have been, and are, derelict in their duties to the law students.
The issue of "background" engendered by the realists' demands for the infiltration of
social, psychological, and economic theories as a part of law teaching is one of the most
debatable proposals offered by the modernists. It is now becoming commonplace to read
that unless this change of method takes place, unless the law adopts this scientific approach,
the decay of the legal profession is quite possible. RoBnIsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at
43-44; Beutel, supra note 12, at 187.
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and "law"-law." These robust terms coined in the laboratories
of the functionalists, washed in cynical acid30 and smeared with skepticism are guaranteed to solve the most involved legal problem-i-at least
when solemnly uttered by the oracles of the fact-approach.
The New Scientific Approack
The functionalists have relegated to the junk pile the "dialectichydraulic-interpretation press" of the poor, deluded logicians of the law
In place thereof the scientific jurists have installed the machines of
modern science, albeit many of the mechanisms are in the blue-print
or 'experimental stage. Here one finds mechanical contraptions clicking
merrily away, grinding out the facts with unerring accuracy, divorced
(thanks be) from the distorted syllogistic output which formerly issued
forth from the discarded machinery of the theoreticians of the law. Here
one finds the chromium-plated devices of science (stream-lined and
knee-actioned): the lie-detector" and the electronic diagnosis apparatus, 2 the "eight-cylinder social machine",83 the behavior estimators
26. Cohen, at 822.
27. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intudtive: The Function of the "Hunch" i '
Judifial
Decision (1929) 14 CoPN. L. Q. 274; Hadley, The Place of the Hunch in Legal Analysts
(1935) 9 TEwLE L. Q. 410; cf. Kennedy, How Do Judges Decide Casis? Address before
Mt. Vernon Lawyers' Ass'n, March 1, 1933, reprinted in Westchester L.J., March 2, 1933;
Kennedy, To Hunch or not to Hunch? N. Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 7, 1933, at 742, 768.
28. Induction is one of the key-words of the new learning in the law; it is in marked
contrast to the deductive method rejected by the realists. Its function is to observe and
to assemble particulars, not to erect universals in the manner of logicians. Facts, not concepts, are the objectives of the inductionists. Nelles, Towards Legal Underaanding (1934)
34 CoL. L. REv. 862.
The disciples of induction are seemingly unmindful of the fact that the prInclpat
"function" of induction is to produce a universal proposition which may be used as a
major premise in the process of deduction. The devotees of induction are not, even under
their own theories, eliminating deduction, but are merely postponing the process. Sel
Cardozo, supra note 12; PYN E, Tma MiN (1926) 299.
Hutchins, a pioneer in realist jurisprudence, has lately argued that induction alono Is
powerless in the solution of legal problems. The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student
(1934) 7 Am. L. Scnoor. REv. 1051, 1055. There is grave danger that functionalism having
turned to the study of facts, things and tangibles, may end by shutting itself up in thaI
reality and closing the mind to the consideration, analysis and evaluation of the facts.
Morris R. Cohen, Law and Scientific Method (1928) 6 Am. L. SCHOOL Ra,. 231, 234-23S.
29. Llewellyn, supra note 25, at 676.
.
30. Cohen, at 830.
31. Beutel, supra note 12, at 175; cf. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 68; lgqover, Sc entifii"
Methods of Crime Detection in the Judicial Process (1935) 4 GEo. VAsih. L. REv. 1.
1-32. "Of all the people in the world we Americans are the most mechanically minded ..
Nowhere is the laboratory so glorified as in the United States .... Nowhere in thQ world
could such medical mumbo-jumbo as Abram's electronic diagnosis or Palmer's ChtropractI.
have originated except in California or Iowa." Wolfe, The Twilight of Psychoanays4
h193s) AwmeuCA MEacuay 385.
33. RoBmNsoxr, op. cit supra note 2, at 6.
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and free-will eliminators,34 the sure-fire questionnaires,-" statistical devices 36 for registering trends, control rooms 37 for systematizing human
actions and departments for investigating the sex life of judges13 and
their inhibitions of childhood days (the more expert manipulators being
trained to hunch as to the hunch of the judges3 ); all these multiple
and variegated machines clicking in amazing unison; machines with
mechanical fingers grabbing particulars, automatically piling up and
weighing the facts, welding them into generalizations, wrapping them
with cellophane and producing the solution of any possible problem of
the legal order, untouched by human hand and without the contamination of ugly universals or delusive deduction. Neatly and accurately
synchronized to the realities of life these mechanical devices can divide
34. Beutel, supra note 12, at 174: "Although the doctrine of the free-willing individual
appears throughout literature, religion, philosophy, and legal dogma, it is surprising to note
that it has very little experimental support."
35. For an example of the naivet6 of the psychologist in accepting the findings of
questionnaires, see TAxT, Wnra-ssEs ni Counr (1934) c. 3.
36. Llewellyn, supra note 25, at 673, makes the point that "when it comes to broadly
social facts in their social bearings, lawyers are helpless---childish ... Is there, for instance,
anything sadder than the nalvet6 with which mere lawyers man-handle stathtics?" Answering Llewellyn, one might suggest that a "sadder" instance of the manhandling of
statistics is found in the unscientific way that the criminologists have been peddling forth
the results of crime surveys, as noted in Mcnamr. mu Anrzs, Canr, LAw AM SocILL

ScI

cm (1933) passim,.

It may comfort the "helpless lawyer" to read the following of

the manner in which sociologists "manhandle" social facts: "Our total knowledge of
society at the present time is far from sufficient to give a 'scientific prcucription' as to
what should be done in a given field to alleviate social, political and economic misfortune.
Many theories now regarded as knowledge are only shots in the dark. We have no right
to apply them on a large social scale or to urge others to do so.
"Rather than any sort of ruler who is a highbrow social scientist, I would rather have a
man of plain common sense from the street. Not until the social scientist is sure that
he has something pragmatic and helpful does he deserve his chance." Prof. Pitiram A.
Sorokin, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, Harvard University, interview in N. Y.
Herald-Tribune, Dec. 30, 1935, at 4.
37. " ... today there are many scientists of standing who will support the propazition
that by controlling the individual's environment you can control his character and predict
his future actions." Beutel, supra note 12, at 175.
This suggestion, of course, is another way of arguing against the freedom of the will.
See note 32, supra. If the individual action is controllable, it might be asked: Who is going
to control the controllers? By what magic of science are we certain to escapa the danger
that the "engineer" in charge of the "control mechanism' may himself be tozed and
twisted about by environment and circumstance, unable to exercise judgment and discretion
in the operation of the levers and gadgets of behavioristic machinery? Whn.rMxu
-STnATroRa, op. cit. supra note 22, at 39-40; McWlliams, Free Will in Nature (1935) 12 MoDmna"
SczooraA 39.
38. Scott, Confessions of a Law Teacher (1928) HAiumo
or m Assoc=%r.o: or
Awr
-csmN
LAw Scnoos 17, 28.
39. One of the most astounding offshoots of realistic writings is the attempt to probe the
unconscious mind of the judges and to bring to the surface the real as distinguished from
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a single fact4 ° into 999,999 parts and, when operated by the most expert
realists, split each of these parts again into 999,999 equal parts-all
to be pigeon-holed in separate compartments in the fact warehouses of
the realists' heaven for instant use when the occasion arises.
workmen
Here in the heaven of functionalism one finds many strange
4
42
41
overrunning the legal edifice: physicists, psychologists, sociologists
mathematicians,44 economists 45 and anthropologists, 4

'

who have grac-

iously entered the realistic heaven and volunteered their services to cure
the law of the shortcomings of scholastic logic and deduction by the injection of a new process called induction or experimentalism. These
the stated reasons of judicial decision. This psychological venture is bravely undertaken
by open minded realists pursuing the closed minds of the judges. Oliphant pleads for an
intellectual dive into the "non-vocal" regions of the judicial mind and the purposeful study
of backgrounds. Oliphant, supra note 22, at 315; cf. Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holmes and
the Nature of Law (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 352-356.
For examples of this "subterranean" process of law-finding, see Nelles, supra note 28, at
862, 884-889; Eno, Unstated Objections in the Law of Sales (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 782.
Dean Wilkinson has pointed out the danger of over-simplifying this quest for possible
reactions of judges to their environment and associations. Wilkinson, John T. LoughranAn Appreciation (1935) 4 FoaDHAm L. Rav. 179, 184. See also, ROBINSON, Op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 193.
40. "I have talked with young disciples of functionalist teachers, who have acquired
such a strong antipathy to conceptualism, and are so impressed with factual differences,
that they are unhappy if a court decides two cases the same way, if there is any slight difference in the facts, as, indeed, there always is, but are perfectly content if the court decides the cases in opposite ways, no matter how slight the difference in the facts." Scott,
supra note 38, at 24.
The writer has further developed the fact-fetish of realism in his article, Principles or
Facts? (1935) 4 FoRanAmx L. Rxv. 53, 61-64.
41. RTJExT, FRom TE PHYSICAL TO mE Sozx SciEcEs (1929); Cohen, supra note 1,
at 822, 827; Beutel, supra note 12, at 172.
42. RoanrsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, Foreword V: "This book attempts to show that
jurisprudence is certain to become one of the family of social sciences--that all of its fundamental concepts will have to be brought into line with psychological knowledge."
Frank, in LAW AwD TE MODRN Mnrm (suranote 3), deals heavily with psychological
materials in relation to law. As elsewhere noted (infra note 54) pet psychological theories,
like behaviorism or psychoanalysis, hold the interest of the realists even after psychologists
have moved on to other fancies. Terman, Psychology and the Law (1935) 40 Com. L. 3.
639.
43. Angel, The Value of Sociology to Law (1933) 31 MicE. L. REv. 512; Harno, supra
note 3.
44. Cohen, at 825.
45. Frank pays tribute to "experimental economics". Supra note 7, at 1065. Beutel points
out that modem economists "are rapidly demonstrating that economic actions are controlled by definite knowable laws." If "applied economics" can be bottomed on "scientific
data", he argues, why not the law? Supra note 12, at 176, 177. Cohen, at 832.
One wonders whether the exponents of "applied economics" resting on "definite know.
able laws" were on sabbatical leave during the pre-depression era.
46. CAIRus, LAW AND TiE SociAL Sc=NCFs (1935).
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volunteers come with the guarantee that the scientific process of induction has worked wonders in their own separate and special heavens;
that the blanket of the deductive method, which smothered progress in
their disciplines has been lifted and the bright light of induction is
illuminating the dark places with rays of reality and piercing the fogs
of fanaticism.and mysticism.
The Law Visits Science
Not content with their neighborly visit to the legal heaven and kindly
assistance in the more efficient operation of the juristic machines, the
scientists press forward with an insistent invitation to the lawyers. They
propose that the legal functionalists journey to the halls of science and
there view at close range the actual accomplishments of the Baconian
formula of induction in contrast with the circular wanderings of the
devotees of deduction. Many good natured quips are directed against
the concepts of the law, legal concepts which match the metaphysical
nonsense typified by such classical conundrums as, "How many angels
can dance on the point of a needle?" 4 7 In place of this ethereal enigma
the pragmatists counter with the eminently practical question, "What
is the best functional approach to the elusive needle in the haystack?"
Here one may sense the realities of the scientific method, the raw stuff
of functionalism in action. Even lawyers, say the scientists, have seen
a needle and a haystack, whereas nobody has ever seen an angel (nor
indeed a corporation," nor a chose in action,40 nor a contract). Hence
the good sense of searching for a needle in a haystack and the abject
nonsense of looking for an angel, or a corporation, or a chose in action,
or a contract-or any of those other concepts so near and dear to the
theoreticians in the law.
On the "home grounds" of the scientists, the "visiting team" of juristic
scholars is royally entertained. Here one looks in vain for the "conceptual acrobatics" of the logicians and the word-magic of the verbalists.
Instead of empty abstractions the scientists lead the lawyer-groups into
their laboratories and reveal their latest experiments fraught with so
many possibilities of utility in the law.
For example, the psychologists point out that one of their most recent
discoveries is the amazing fact that brain power may be determined by
chest measurement. More convincing still, the psychologists prove the
validity of their hypothesis by disclosing actual measurements made
47. This is a stock example of the type of thought which, it is alleged, permeates presentday legal thinking. Cohen, at 810; ROBInSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 51.

48. "Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in corporations
if we don't believe in angels?" Cohen, at 811.
49.
690.

Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York (1926) 35 YArz L. J. 639,
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with an actual tape measure on actual chests." Instead of the mysticiTm of the "'laying on of hands" (reminiscent of the, "medicine men" ofconceptualism) the mind-experts propose the "laying on of tabo imeas-,
Ures." How pregnant with opportunities to imlSrove the law is this
new discovery of sciencel The quality of law students, lawyers and
judges may be determined by the simple application of a tape measurea sort of a "pulmonic approach" (shall we say) to a more abundant
legal life. Criminologists whisper to the lawyers that they have decided
that a'crime is an act, and nothing but an act, stripped of all conceptual
nonsense about a guilty mind, premeditated action, or a menS rea, these
concepts being but a mess of senseless verbiage engrafted upon the law
by the mind-ridden moralists of the Dark Ages.1 The obvious result
is a movement'to scrape the classical criminal law to the bone and revitalize it in terms of psychoanalysis,52 behaviorisrh5 3 or: some other
evanescent theory of modern psychology. 4 In one :final brOadside for
the use of scientific methods in the law, the advocates of the new order
posit this unanswerable query: If science has cleaned up ,the pest holes
of Panama, why not use the same methods to bring about ,the regularity
of human and social activities?" Now that science is prepared to
irgie agairist the freedom of the will, there seems to be no reasonable
ground for quarreling with the conclusion that mosquitoes and men may
50. Dr. S. A. Weisman, Address. Before Convention of American College of Surgeons,
N. Y. Herald-Tribune, May 2, 1935, at 21.
51. "A crime is an act. It is not an act plus an intent." Levitt,
Extent and Funclon
of the Doctrin'e of Mens Rea (1923) 17 ILr.,
L. REV. 578, 589; cf. Sayre, Mens Rea in
Criminal Law, HARv. LEGAL 'ESSAYS (1934) 399.
* 52. Psychoanalysis is the basis of Frank's interpretation of law in LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND. Supra note 3. See RoBINSOx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 333.
53. Supra note 22. See Dashiell, The Objective Character of' Legal Intent (1931) 38
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIE W 529-537.
54. Functionalism poses as a "scientific" approach to the law, an unblaied, fearless
method of viewing the'facts, a stern rejection of the a priori reasoning familiar in older
types of juristic thought. In fact there is a marked tendency among functionalists to offer
to the law some current dogma of a single controverted psychological school and to Insist
that it must be accepted. In so doing 'functionalism is guilty of the same a priori dogmatism which it charges against the logicians. Pound, The Call for a Realst Jurisprudcnce
(1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 697, 706.
The functionalists quarrel among themselves about the value and worth of contesting
psychological theories and yet join together in berating the lawyers because they refuse
to grant these theories entrance in the legal order. Beutel argues for behavioristic psychology (supra note 12), while Robinson says that "as a school of thought behaviorlsm hag
now nearly died out... ." Op. cit. supra note 2, at 103. Frank's LAw AND TUE MODERN
MIND (supra note 3) rests upon an interpretation of law in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis.
Elsewhere we read that psychoanalysis with its underlying dogma of mechanistic animism
is basically unsound and obsolete. Wolfe, supra note 32, at 385; Robinson agrees that "this
theory [psychoanalysis] is full of grotesque details that are essentially unscientific. .. .
Op. cit. supra at 60. See also id. at 140, 171, 186.
55. Beutel, supra note 12, at 174-175; cf. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 68.
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be regulated and controlled by like scientific methods. Why not, indeed,
abandon the imperfect performance of conceptualism for the glowing
promise of functionalism? Impatient at the uplifted eyebrows of the
more conservative lawyers, who express doubt about the far flung
effects of these experiments in social control, the scientists indignantly
recall that skeptcismCG is their own peculiar attribute, and that it is
manifestly unfair for the conceptualists to betray lingering doubts about
the promised program of science. In other words, the stand-patters of
the law are informed that they must accept, without cavil, the futurity"
of science for the futility of logic.
So in the heavens of the economists, sociologists, anthropologists and
physicists, the juristic functionalists spend long hours in awesome admiration of the countless experiments of Science, experiments proven and
verified, checked and double-checked, experiments dripping with cold
facts. The disclosure of this valuable information leads to the plausible
suggestion by the scientists that this conglomerated mass of physical,
sociological and economic data (dressed up in scientific terms)! may
be fused and squeezed into the law, or at least that this technique of
omniscience may give birth to the evaluation of law "in action" and
not merely of law "in books." Thus in the special heaven of the
functionalists the face of the Law is '"ifted" and beautified by Science;
in place of the "hair-splitting machine" of the conceptualists (now
happily discarded) Science has installed a hair-curling mechanism which
is guaranteed to impress a permanent wave of progress and perfection
upon the brow of the Law.
One more area of the functionalists' heaven remains to be developed.
Confronted with the beneficial effects of Science working upon the law
it is now suggested that the Law should establish a permanent home
(one must never say, domicile) in the heaven of Science, abandoning for
all time the old homesteads of logic, concept, free will, principle and
precedent. Why return at all to the old order when the new scientific
approach promises so much-and follows promise with performance.
Cut away from traditional doctrine and begin anew. After a realistic
huddle and a functional hunch, our younger law teachers and students',
decide to give up the dogmas of legal theology, bid adieu to Cardozoco
56. Frank, supra note 7, at 1063.
57. For instances of "promissory notes" of functionalism payable "in futuro," the
reader is referred to 'Beutel, supra note 12, ROB"MSO', Op. cit. supra note 2, and Cohen.
58. Supra notes 19-29.
59. Cohen, at 833.
60. FAnss:, op. cit. supra note 3, at 236-239; cf. RoBrsoNr, op. ci. supra note 2. at 237;
Cohen, at 809-811.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. S

Brandeis,"' Dean Pound, 2 Beale, 3 Williston"4 and Wigmore,11 defenders
of tradition and precedent in varying degrees.60 The really creative
thinkers of the future will join forces with Watson, 7 Freud, 8 Veblen"
and the other master minds of science itching to "plow under" the old
order and give us a "New Deal" in the law. 70 And so plans and specifications are being prepared which call for a rather complete abdication of the
Law (as formerly defined, taught and practised), and the entry of
Science, not merely as a friendly adviser, but as an all powerful, legal
Der Fuelrer. True, this last step is still in the making, but the advocates of functionalism assure us that it is going to happen and-let it
be remembered-the scientists never confuse fact with fiction, nor intermix elusive expectation with established experiment. 7' When the
heaven of functionalism is fully developed, Law will be but a memory.
Science-not LawT2 -will be King, nay more, Science will be King,
Queen, Jack and indeed the whole legal pack.
II

FUNCTIONALISM IN ACTION

Hyperbolical description of legal theories-whether penned by functionalist or conceptualist-serves but the limited purpose of directing
attention to some of the inconsistencies and excesses which characterize
the given movement. The fanciful fabrication of "heavens" to house the
competitive advocates of function or concept is at best a caricature
which catches imperfections and trends and magnifies them out of their
true proportion with an eye to their accentuation. Writing in the skies
is a vaporous and impermanent method of solving earthly problems;
61. For a mild criticism of Brandeis, see Cohen, at 811.
62. FRA.-K, op. cit. supra note 3, at 207-216.
63. Beale is the arch-disciple of conceptualistic dogma, say the realists. Id. at 48-56;
Cook, Book Review (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1154. See infra note 89.
64. Cohen, at 833.
65. Ibid.
66. While Brandeis and Cardozo manifest a liberal attitude toward judicial law-making,
place in judicial process,
they insist that the doctrine of precedent still occupies first
CARDozo, TnE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PaocEss (1921). 149; see dissenting opinion of
Brandeis J., in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932).
67. Supra notes 22, 54.
68. Supra note 54.
69. Cohen, at 832.
70. Kennedy, The New Deal in the Law, Address before Bronx County Bar Ass'n, Oct.
12, 1934, reprinted in N. Y. L. J., Oct. 13, 1934, at 721, (1934) 68 U. S. L. REV. 533, (1934)
2 U. S. L. Week 41.
71. Nelles, supra note 28, at 862; ROBINsON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19.
72. "What must the King do now? must he submit?
The King shall do it: must he be deposed?
The King shall be contented: must he lose
The name of King?"
Shakespeare, King Richard III.
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the real battle between realists and logicians, between the old and the
new theories of law and law-making, will be fought on the ground, not
in the air. The issue will be determined by the effective way in which
the contending groups grapple with the work-a-day questions of law.
Descending from the juristic "heavens" and leaving above "such
stuff as dreams are made of", let us consider how the "ground crew" of
the functionalists is functioning, how they propose to come to grips
with the bread and butter controversies, whether they have accomplished, as asserted, "the final debunking of the legal profession, by
calling attention to some of the actualities in the legal order and insisting upon 'grubbing for facts' ".7
By way of introduction it is submitted that two major objectives face
the realists and the functionalists in their aim and purpose of substantially altering the classical method of deciding cases by adhering to
principle or precedent: (1) they must accurately and convincingly assay
the present-day methods of adjudication and point out the defects which
exist therein without enlargement or exaggeration of the evils chronic
in the present system. Nor will it suffice that the reformers indicate
imperfections and shortcomings in the classical tradition. Concededly
these imperfections exist (and perhaps always will exist) but the question remains whether the legal machine now operating should be overhauled or junked and a new machine installed in its place. (2) Having
established the breakdown of the common law methods the task of the
functionalists is not over. They must submit and establish a reform
program and prove that it will function better than the traditional
methods in vogue in our day and place. "To destroy the case of one's
opponents and to justify one's own are two different things". 4 Before
the ancient house of the law is dismantled . the functionalists are asked
to file a bond promissory of betterment and a guarantee that realism is
real and that the functional approach is an approach and not a retreat.
One more condition: In this period of transition and change, the proponents of the New Deal in the law must submit to the critical examination
of their evidence, must bear the affirmative of the issues, and must
establish the "experiential capacity"70 of the experts offered by functionalism before their testimony is given full credence and their formulas
are translated into action.
73.

Beutel, supra note 12 at 169.

74. Theodore Roosevelt, The Search for Truth (1913) Hisroy As Lrrms

252.

75. A somewhat analogous situation arises in the law when a tenant is threatening to
injure the reversioner's interest. tt is, in general, no justification for an act of waste that
a party will, at some future time, put the premises in the same condition as they were when
the lease was made. . . . How can it be known, as a matter of law, that a tenant will
retrace his steps and repair an injury which he has deliberately caused?" Agate v.
Lowenbein, 57 N. Y. 604, 614 (1874).
EvnExcE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 555-571.
76. 1 Wiopto,
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Functionalism-And Youth
The modest objective of this paper is to suggest that nonsense is not
in the sole possession of the conceptualists. In no small degree is nonsense beginning to appear in the writings of the functionalists. Our
central purpose, therefore, is not to prove that traditional law is a perfect
system or that it defies improvement. Functionalism has very ably and
properly pointed out that there are yawning chasms in the law which
should be filled in and which may be bridged over by considering the
results and consequences of a given law in action. Concededly, functionalism has a place in the legal order, provided that it keeps its place.
But it seems timely to warn "the more intelligent of our younger law
teachers and students""7 that youth has an impulsive and insatiable urge
to pull things apart just to see how the wheels go round. This juvenile
propensity, first developed in the nursery, may find belated expression
in more mature years. Frank suggests that man's quest for certainty
in the law is traceable to a survival of the childish reliance upon the
omnipotence of its father.7 8 We offer the counter suggestion that the
itch for change in the law may be traceable to the restless impatience
70
of youth seeking utterance in their legal philosophies.
But whatever its origin, whether due to the influence of youth or to
the inevitable excesses incident to the formation of a new juristic movement, the fact remains that there are evidences of nonsense in functional and realistic literature which are holding back the spread of functionalism and causing the conservatives in the law to withhold even
partial recognition of the attack upon the classical tradition.
A Lesson in Grammar
One cannot fairly object when functionalists venture a guess as to
the developing course of law in the years to come. If they are of the
opinion that there are rumblings of a legal revolution in luturo and so
state, their prophetic views may or may not materialize. Who knows?
But when the critic of existing institutions of law passes from the
permissive area of prediction and essays the statement of present-day
conditions in the law, he is dealing with visible facts of our day and
place. Tangible evidence is available to test out the truth or falsity of
his assertions. There is an appreciable difference between the present
and the future tense-in grammar and in legal criticism. It is feared
that the functionalists in their enthusiasm to advertise and to sell their
wares have confused promise with performance, have distorted hopes
77.

Cohen, at 833.

78. FRAN:x, op. cit. supra note 3, c. 2.
79. The writer has further developed the point that realism is essentially a youthmovement in Principles or Facts? supra note 8, at 56-57.
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In their emphasis upon the importance of finding

the outside facts in the decision of cases, they have omitted to evaluate
accurately the inside facts concerning the present status of experimentalism and realism.
Frank confidently tells us that "The experimental attitude.., is
an

attitude which has spread everywhere."80 Cohen expresses the opinion
that "the age of the classical jurist is over"."' Such statements are expressive of the present facts-not prophecies as to the future. Independently of what may happen, the announcement of the present demise of
the classical era, like the erroneous report of Mark Twain's death, is

grossly exaggerated and slightly premature.
Personifying the classical era of the law, which we are told is now
over, are men of the type of Dean Pound,82 Williston, 3 Wigmore84 and
Beale;8 5 it is said that their reign is at an end; that their legal methods
and technique are now outmoded and functionally unsound. "Creative
thinkers" armed with statistics, charts, graphs, questionnaires, tape
measures and hunch-producers are ready to take their places3P What
are the facts?

At the moment when the functionalists are lowering the mantle of
oblivion upon Williston and his classical terminology (with a gesture of
thanks for "yeoman service in clarifying the logical implications and

inconsistencies of judicial doctrines"8 7) announcement is made that

So. Frank, supra note 7, at 1066.
81. Cohen, at 833.
82. Supra note 62.
83. Supra note 64.
84. Supra note 65.
85. Supra note 63.
86. Supra notes 31-46.
87. Cohen, at 833.
To state, or to imply, that Williston, is alone concerned with "clarifying the logical implications" of judicial doctrines is to reveal an utter lack of knowledge of Williston's work
in codifying the law of sales, bills of lading and warehouse receipts. Before some of the
present-day functionalists were out of their swaddling clothes, Williston set for himself the
task of reforming the law and criticising decisions "where they seemed opposed to principle
ILsoN, SALEs (Ist ed. 1909) Preface.
and to the convenience of trade." Wu
By way of concrete example, note that it was Williston who insisted that "value" is
present when a creditor receives goods, bills of lading, or warehouse receipts in extinguishment of or as security for antecedent indebtedness. Despite the fact that judicial decisions were opposed to this definition of "value," Williston fought for the change and
implanted this definition in the Uniform Sales Act, Uniform Bills of Lading Act and Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. Commissioners' Note, 1 Uzwoass LAws Azr;. (1931) 443,
449; Wnrisrox Au McCuany, CAsEs oN S.ALEs (1932) 430, 431; 2 Wns-TO:N, SALEs (2d
ed. 1924) 1563.
New York, which inconsistently rejected this definition of "value" in the original passage of the Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Bills of Lading Act in 1911, has finally adopted
the view of Williston. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 455, N. Y. Pxns. Pnor. Lw (1935) § 156;
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Williston is hard at work on a new edition of his masterful treatise on
contracts, and, mirabile dictu, the legal profession seems to be manifesting keen interest in this new "relic" of traditional contract law.
One might venture the prediction that lawyers will "approach" problems
of contract law for the immediate present by turning to Williston, the
lawyer, rather than to Watson, the psychologist.88 Beale, the archdisciple of conceptualism, has just published his monumental work on
Conflict of Laws seemingly unaware that his usefulness came to an end
with the arrival of realism. It may be that his theories of conflict of
laws, written into text and Restatement of Conflict of Laws, will die out
in other times under the vigorous attack of the functionalists." Conservative opinion exists that, here and now, Beale dominates the law
in his life-long specialty-and will probably do so for many years. Professor Wigmore, it is true, has retired from his active career as a law
teacher at Northwestern University, but his classical text on Evidence
still holds forth in Anglo-American law as the guide of judge and lawyer.
The point about this "lesson in grammar" is that functionalism is on
safer ground when it speaks in the future tense. Classical law is still
a vigorous and hardy perennial; functionalism should be content with
pruning the branches of the classical tradition rather than proclaiming
that a "revision to the roots" is already under way.
III

CoRpoRATIoN-A "BANKRUPT"

CONCEPT

One part of the traditional method of settling legal problems which
has been fair game for criticism by the modernists is the practice of
N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 455, N. Y. PERS. PRor. LAv (1935) § 239. Kennedy, "Value"-A Plea
for Uniformity in New York Commercial Law (1933) 8 ST. JoiiN's L. Rav. 1; Comment
(1936) 5 FORDuAM L. REV. 80.
88. Supra notes 22, 54.
89. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the CoAflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. 3.
457; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
736; Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (1935) 83 U. or PA.
L. REV. 555; Cook, loc. cit. supra note 63; cf. Goodrich, Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers
(1936) 84 U. or PA. L. REv. 448.
Applying the realists' test of the law "as is," it may not be impertinent to recall that
Beale offers an interesting "box score" in the contest between his "vested rights theory"
and the opposing theories of functionalism in the single area of contract law. Beale contends (citing statistics) that in the last twenty-seven years the trend of the states has been
in the direction of the adoption of the lex loci contractus (the vested rights theory as to the
creation of contracts). 2 BEE, Cou-L.cr or LAWS (1935) 1172-1173. The wide variance
between the estimate of Cohen that the "vested rights" theory of conflict of laws Is
"bankrupt" (p. 823) and the view of Beale may be worth noting. Beale says: "It is probable that before many years have passed the influence of the American Law Institute
[the body responsible for the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws] will have led to the
abandonment of intention of the parties, and to the general adoption of the law of the
place of contracting." op. cit. supra, at 1174.

1936]

FUNCTIONAL NONSENSE

the conceptualist lawyer to produce his bag of principles and precedents
and pull out a choice rule or maxim or case ready made for instant use
in the solution of most difficult legal problems. The critics 0 have made
telling use of the contention that legal concepts are empty, mouth-filling
words cluttering the pages of reports and text books and preventing
a pragmatic, functional approach to the decision of cases. We enter the
last stage of the bombardment of conceptual thinking in the law with
the attack of Felix S. Cohen.91 Impatient with the piecemeal and fragmentary criticism of single segments of legal concepts, Cohen argues
for the wholesale ouster of the concepts of Corporation, Contract, Title,
Due Process and Property. 2 In metaphorical terms he contends that
involuntary petitions in bankruptcy have been filed against these concepts and others. 3 Cohen begins his onslaught by directing his fire
against the Corporation concept, concededly a basic fiction of the old
law and still deeply imbedded in the traditional approach. Formerly
it was possible to complain that the functional reformers talked about
the law but seldom of the law. 4 But Cohen, with commendable directness, takes up specific cases and decisions, first stating them in terms
of concept and principle, then pointing out the vice and inherent limitations of the traditional approach, and concluding with the statement
of the methods of functionalism and its advantages when applied to the
given situation.
Adopting this mode of attack, he advances to his task of demolishing
the ancient myth of corporation and showing the superior excellence of
realistic devices. Cohen sets up his problem by reference to the
familiar case of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co1 The facts are
simple. The Susquehanna Coal Co. was a foreign corporation chartered
by the state of Pennsylvania. It was sued in New York, service being
effected upon an officer of the corporation as required by New York
law. The New York Court of Appeals found that the corporation had
an office in New York, with salesmen and desks, was doing business in
the state, and was suable in its courts. Cohen bitterly condemns the
manner in which Cardozo and the New York Court of Appeals deal
with the question, Where is a corporation? He asserts that the conclusion that the foreign corporation was "in" New York, and therefore
90. Supra notes 1-7.
91.

Cohen, supra note 1.

92.

Id. at 820, 821.

93.

Id. at 823.

94. Frank's book (o. cit. supra note 3) is p'ractically devoid of reference to cases and
decisions; it is replete with quotations from extra-legal sources. The criticism is directed
not to the fact that he included non-legal authorities, but rather to the omioion in his
study of the very material he sets out to analyze.
95. 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
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suable therein, matches in metaphysical status the query, "How many
angels can stand on the head of a needle?" symbolic "of an age in
which thought without roots in reality was an object of high esteem."
He continues:
"Will future historians deal more charitably with such legal questions as
Where is a corporation? Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right
have we to believe in corporations if we don't believe in angels? To be sure,
some of us have seen corporate funds, corporate transactions, etc. (just as
some of us have seen angelic deeds, angelic countenances, etc.) But this does
not give us the right to hypostatize, to 'thingify,' the corporation, and to
assume that it travels about from State to State as mortal men travel. Surely
we are qualifying as inmates of Von Jhering's heaven of legal concepts when
we approach a legal problem in these essentially supernatural terms.
"Yet it is exactly in these terms of transcendental nonsense that the Court
of Appeals approached the question of whether the Susquehanna Coal Company
could be sued in New York State. 'The essential thing,' said Judgej Cardozo,
writing for a unanimous court, 'is that the corporation shall have come into the
State.' Why this journey is essential, or how it is possible, we are not informed." 96
The critic of functionalism must concede that Cohen sets up no straw
man to l e bowled over by his realistic lance, no concept-minded conservative to be riddled by the shafts of functionalism. Cardozo is his
first target, the philosopher-judge who spends his leisure hours in reflecting upon the judicial process,97 and the mouthpiece in the Taiza
case of "an exceptionally able court." More than that, Cohen indicts
justice Brandeis of uttering the same "transcendental nonsense" in deciding the situs of a foreign corporation for purposes of suit.", And may
we add that Cohen might also have included Holmes in his indictment
against the "thingifying" of a foreign corporation. 9 It may be at once
admitted that if the opinions of Cardozo, Brandeis and Holmes reveal
types of reasoning "without roots in reality" his case against the continuance of this conceptual thinking is convincingly established.
Cohen's argument proves too much; he not only reads out of the law
the myth of a foreign corporation travelling from state to state, but he
likewise upsets the myth of a domestic corporation journeying within
-the borders of the state of -incorporatiorn.--It is-just -as-difficult- to "see"
96. Cohen, at 811. (italics in original text.)
97. Justice Cardozo once humorously said: " . . . I find there is a fairly general notion
among my brethren at the Bar, that in some occult way I invented the judicial process and

am esponsible for its existence."

Address, Naw YoRx COUNTz LAw-'vRS' Ass'N, YEAR'

Boox (1932) 371.

98. Cohen, at 811-812.
99. Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 194 (1914); Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 260 U. S.516 (1923); Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank,
261 U. S.171 (1923).
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a domestic corporation at home, as it is to "see" a foreign corporation
abroad.10°
The load of the functionalist who aims to erase from the law the
corporate concept (even in the narrow field of corporate "travel" from
state to state) is a heavy one to carry although stated in terms of
vibrant realism with its emphasis upon tangibles and things and its
abhorrence of intangibles and abstractions. One discerns in the argument realistic gymnastics quite as elusive and evasive as the "conceptual
acrobatics" charged against the schoolmen. Non sequiturs (as the old
fashioned logician might phrase it) or punctures of the "pattern" and
blowouts of the "background" (to borrow the "it"-words of realism)
sometimes upset the universals of the realist no less than of the conceptualist. In generalibus dolor latet. To say that a corporation is
not because it cannot be seen is a somewhat startling generalization
for a functionalist to parade before his readers consistently and without
yawning gaps in the reasoning. Let us follow through Cohen's ingenious argument.
Having pronounced the death sentence over foreign corporations, it
is surprising to read the concession that "some of us have seen corporate
funds, corporate transactions, etc. (just as some of us have seen angelic
deeds, angelic countenances, etc.)." Does Cohen mean that "corporate
funds" and "corporate transactions" are real and can be "seen" in contrast with the corporation itself which "nobody has ever seen?",' If
so, the distinction is a most subtle and unsatisfactory one. The shift
from the noun, corporation, to the adjective, corporate, possesses no
magical power of breathing life and tangibility into the invisible corporation. It is just as mystifying and "thingifying" to see a "corporate
fund" or to see a corporation entering into a "transaction" as it is to see
a foreign corporation entering into a state. The fact of the matter is
that corporations whether at home or abroad are doing many things,
engaging in many transactions, owning corporate funds, embarking in
business in many states and to deny reality to these many ramifications
of corporate activity because they are not carried on as "mortal man"
acts is not devoid of the nonsense which Cohen charges against Cardozo
and Brandeis.
Functionalism "Sees" the Corporation
The functionalist, having pricked the corporate bubble inflated with
the airy nonsense of transcendentalism, now proceeds to outline and to
100. Kennedy, The Scientific Approach in the Law (1936) 70 U. S. L. RE v. 75, 78.

lo0.

It may be that Cohen merely means that "corporate transactions" and "corporate

funds" are just as unreal as "angelic deeds", neither having anything more than metaphysical existence. If so, he is emphasizing his ouster of the corporation concept and its
train of imaginary satellites.
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construct the functional. approach to the same situation, the realistic
manner in which the modern jurists would deal with the foreign corporation. Before following functionalism through the second step, let it be
clearly recalled that the New York Court of Appeals and other courts
have already been accused of indulging in arrant nonsense because they
saw, or pretended to see, this elusive foreign corporation stalking into
foreign states and doing business therein in the manner of mortal men.
What then is Cohen's realistic solution of this vexing question? He says:
"If a competent legislature had considered the problem of when a corporation incorporated in another State should be subject to suit, it would probably
have made some factual inquiry into the practice of modern corporations in
choosing their sovereigns and into the actual significance of the relationship
between a corporation and the state of its incorporation. It might have considered the difficulties that injured plaintiffs may encounter if they have to
bring suit against corporate defendants in the state of incorporation. It might
have balanced, against such difficulties, the possible hardship to corporations
of having to defend actions in many states, considering the legal facilities
available to corporate defendants. On the basis of facts revealed by such an
inquiry, and on the basis of certain political or ethical value judgments as to
the propriety of putting financial burdens upon corporations, a competent
legislature would have attempted to formulate some rule as to when a foreign
corporation should be subject to suit."102
To state it mildly, this solution of functionalism is a rather violent turnabout-face from the preceding position. Despite his contention that it
is a myth of metaphysical origin for the courts to say that a foreign corporation may travel from state to state, Cohen calmly considers the
realistic approach which a "competent legislature" would take in considering the problem of "when a corporation incorporated in another
state should be subject to suit". Thus the corporation concept, figuratively booted out of the courts of the foreign state (because it cannot
be seen in the state) bobs up serenely and is plainly visible to the
legislature of the same foreign state. To the legislature this search
for the foreign corporation suddenly becomes "a thoroughly practical
one"-a real, tangible problem to be approached in the functional manner
for the purpose of attempting "to formulate some rule as to when a
foreign corporation should be subject to suit." Cohen does not venture
to tell us what the "rule" (detestable word of conceptualism) should
be, nor wherein the functional "rule" would differ from the one in force
in the Tauza case. His complaint is not that the Tauza holding or its
results are objectionable; his criticism is directed to "the mode of reasoning by which this decision was reached".'
102.
103.

Id. at 810. (italics in original text.)
Ibid.
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The antagonists of functionalism also file a caveat against the "mode
of reasoning" which Cohen uses to bankrupt the corporation concept.
They suggest that his reasoning is a piece of verbal calisthenics, surpassing the angels-on-the-head-of-a-needle riddle. It is certainly fantastic
to concede that realists and legislatures can view "in a practical manner"
the foreign corporation travelling in the land, engaging in business, entering into the political and industrial life of the foreign states, affecting
the lives of the citizenry; and at the same time to contend that the
courts, viewing this same panorama of corporate activities, are guilty
of transcendental nonsense in facing and dealing with the identical factsituation. Otherwise stated, functionalism asserts that the actualities of
corporate presence can be detected through the "one hundred inch
telescope" of realistic design, but that it is not "possible" to see a
foreign corporation when viewed through the misty spectacles of judicial
conceptualism.
Returning once more to the sweeping generalization--"nobody has
ever seen a corporation" 1 0 4-- it now seems that this universal statement
needs some revision; the major premise of the realist's syllogism is a
bit shaky; it must be whittled down to fit the precious facts. Restated,
it should read that nobody has ever seen a corporation-except the
state of incorporation, competent legislatures and far-seeing realists!
So revised, it appears that the corporation myth is not "nonsense" at all
times but only when muddled by the transcendental-minded Cardozo or
Brandeis who use the wrong words-but reach an unobjectionable result. Instead of saying that the corporation functions in the foreign
state, Cardozo and Brandeis say that the foreign corporation is in the
foreign state-and hence are guilty of transcendental nonsense!
Functionalism "Solves" the Corporate Problem
Functionalism has frequently emphasized the importance of factfinding, the grubbing for the facts, the digging into the dirt of actualities
and searching for tangibles and things.' 0° Usually these pragmatic
remedies are prescribed without a patient in sight, are offered generally
as a cure-all for the sick man of the law. Cohen, however, with commendable candor writes out the prescription in definite form and offers
it as a palliative for a particular malady, namely, the senseless manner
in which Cardozo and his associates mutilated the Tauza case. His
diagnosis of juristic nonsense completed, Cohen pens the functional
formula which will alleviate the word-magic of corporate fictions. The
prescription0 0 runs as follows: (1) Collect factual inquiries about mod104. Id. at 811.
105. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 58-64.
106. See p. 290, supra.
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ern corporations; (2) mix in the difficulties attendant upon compelling
plaintiffs to sue in the state of incorporation; (3) stir with certain
political or ethical value-judgments; (4) add plenty of economic and
sociological investigations. Shake well so that the ingredients of factual
inquiries, difficulties and political and ethical value-judgments are
thoroughly intermixed-and serve. Thus the problem is solvedl IHaving set down the required ingredients, the functionalist placidly leaves
the scene without any attempt to obtain the suggested ingredients, or to
show how they can be obtained; or to predict what the result will be
after they have been applied; or to disclose wherein the result will differ
from the "rule" set down in the Tauza case. After wrecking the corporation concept-like the bad boy picking his father's watch apartthe functionalist offers a new vocabulary to the befuddled lawyer, and
departs.
Before leaving the scene Cohen issues one final broadside against
Cardozo and the New York Court of Appeals:
"The [New York] Court of Appeals reached its decision without avowedly
considering any of these mattes [referring to legislative inquiries].*T It does
not appear that scientific evidence on any of these issues wa5 offered to the
court. Instead of addressing itself to such economic, sociological, political, or
ethical questions as a competent legislature night have faced, the court addressed itself to the question, 'Where is a corporation?' Was this corporation
really in Pennsylvania or in New York or could it be in two places at once?
"Clearly the question of where a corporation is, when it incorporates in one
state and has agents transacting corporate business in another state, is not a
question that can be answered by empirical observation. Nor is it a question
that demands for its solution any analysis of political considerations or social
ideals."' 0 8
To charge that the New York Court of Appeals reached its decision
as to the suability of a foreign corporation without addressing itself
"to the economic, sociological, political or ethical questions" is to ignore
the history and flux of precedents leading up to and latent in the Tauza
case. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.' is but a link in a chain of
decisions, a chain whose links have been forged and hammered, altered
and removed from time to time. The story of the institution, pattern
or background (to borrow functional words) of the foreign corporation
cannot, and should not, be sought in an isolated decision, pulled out of
its setting, but rather should be viewed in the march of judicial decisions
down the years. The advantage of stare decisis-its safety valve and
brake-is that it is a system which accumulates the wisdom and exper107. Ibid.
108. Cohen, at 810.
109.

(italics in original.)

220 N. Y. 259, 150 N. E. 915 (1917).
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ience of the past and offers it to the judges of the present as a substitute
for, or a warning against, precipitate, individualized and arbitrary
action."10
Looking back of the scene which confronted the New York Court of
Appeals in deciding the Tauza case, there is ample warrant for the assertion that the courts have realistically and functionally considered the
results and consequences of the advent of the foreign corporation. The
present rule that the foreign corporation may be sued when it is "doing
business" in the distant state was not the special "brain child" of the
This well considered principle of today
New York Court of Appeals.'
evolved slowly, painfully and after many pauses.
Cohen's plea for an "ethical value-judgment" is visible in the early
case of Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French when the court pointed out
that "it cannot be deemed unreasonable that the state of Ohio should
endeavor to secure to its citizens a remedy in their domestic forum""[against foreign corporations]. There is functional approach aplenty in
the statement of the reasons for the present rule in the leading case of
St. Clairv. Cox:
"This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation from suit in a State other
than that of its creation was the cause of much inconvenience, and often of
manifest injustice. The great increase in the number of corporations of late
years, and the immense extent of their business, only made this inconvenience
and injustice more frequent and marked. Corporations now enter into all the
industries of the country. The business of banking, mining, manufacturing,
transportation, and insurance is almost entirely carried on by them, and a
large portion of the wealth of the country is in their hands. Incorporated under
the laws of one State, they carry on the most extensive operations in other
States. To meet and obviate this inconvenience and injustice, the legislature
of several States interposed, and provided for service of process on officers and
agents of foreign corporations doing business therein.

Whilst the theoretical

and legal view, that the domicile of a corporationis only in the State where it
is created, was admitted, it was perceived that when a foreign corporationsent
its officers and agents into other States and offices, and carried on its business
there, it was, in effect, as much represented by themst there as in the State of its
creation. As it was protected by the laws of those States, allowed to carry
on its business within their borders, and to sue in their courts, it seemed only
right that it should be held responsible in those courts to obligations and
liabilities there incurred.""13
110. Kennedy, supra notes 2, 8, 70.
111. For a brief history of the evolution of the law of New York regarding sEreice oil

foreign corporations, see Kennedy, supra note 49, at 69940D. The same topic is covered
in H xDRsoxN,,Tim Posmnoy oF FoREGN- Co.PoRATioNs xr, Aia'nnc Coxsmuyx'no:n;, Lkw
(1918) 79.
112. 59 U. S. 396, 407 (1855).
113. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 355 (1882).
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The general charge made by Cohen that the basic question of the Tauza
case, Where is a corporation? prevents the consideration of non-legal
data, is clearly not substantiated by a reference to the leading cases on
this subject. Surely the realists do not insist that each time the court
repeats this principle it must likewise repeat in a fulsome manner all
the previous arguments collectable out of past decisions. Even though
the Tauza case is silent as to the earlier.cases like Lafayette Insurance
Co. v. French and St. Clair v. Cox, the spirit, if not the language, of
these decisions is before the New York Court of Appeals.
A Bit of "Conceptual" Functionalism
Before concluding the consideration of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., it may be interesting to seek out the origin and source of Cohen's
criticism that Cardozo and Brandeis and other judges are "thingifying",
creating a fiction, and uttering transcendental nonsense when they detect
a foreign corporation and see it travelling from state to state. One might
expect to find that the ammunition for the functional broadside against
the foreign corporation came from the arsenals of sociological, functional,
institutional, scientific, experimental, realistic and neo-realistic jurisprudence which are dedicated to the ouster of worthless legal concepts. But
alas! This robust contribution to the betterment of law cannot be
claimed by the modernists.
In McQueen v. Middletown Manufacturing Co.,"1 4 decided over a

century ago, it was observed that an officer of a foreign corporation did
not represent the corporation in New York and that "his function and
his character would not accompany him when he moved beyond the
jurisdiction of the government under whose laws he derived this character". Such an expression should arouse enthusiastic endorsement from
the present-day functionalists. Both in substance, and even in the use
of the realistic term, function, McQueen v. Middletown Manufacturing
Co. clicks with'the contention of Cohen, that a corporation cannot be
seen outside of the state of origin, cannot travel abroad. Respectable
support for the same view came out of Massachusetts in the early case of
Peckham v. North Parishin Haverhill.11 But these isolated instances
of "rugged realism" soon give way to the so-called "nonsense" of the
present era and we read of the United States Supreme Court endorsing," 06 after first rejecting the dictum of the McQueen case," 1 the power
of a state to entertain a suit against a foreign corporation. The cases
continue to pile up, all reinforcing the doctrine applied by the New York
Court of Appeals in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co."'
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

16 Johns. 4, 6 (N. Y. 1819).
16 Pick. 274 (Mass. 1834).
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882).
Id. at 354.
See HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 111, passim.
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The truth of the matter is that cases of the type of McQueen v.
Middletown Manufacturing Co. and Peckham v. North Parishin Haverhill are so-called Conceptualism in its worst form and do not cease to be
such because of their tardy revival by fact-finding functionalists; while
the Tauza case is essentially Realism in its best dress, viewing the thing
Cas is," recognizing that a foreign corporation is in New York, doing
business in the state, touching the economic and political life of the
state, functioning as a real institution, and ethically and equitably subject to action by aggrieved parties in the courts of the foreign state.
The functionalist who berates all concepts as types of Perpetuated
stupidity 1 9 may learn an interesting lesson anent the flexibility of the
concept and its readiness to "grub" for facts by studying the course of
the concept of foreign corporations in America. Trial and error in
goodly measure showed forth before the present rule of the Tauza case
assumed final shape.
One thing seems clear. It will take considerable persuasive power
to convince the lawyers that Cohen has upset the soundness of Tauzq v.
Susquehanna Coal Co. (in language or in result) by invoking the departed spirit of McQueen v. Middletown Manufacturing Co. If this
treatment of the Corporation concept is a sample of functionalism in
action, it is suspected that the bulk of the legal profession will prefer
to trail along with the "transcendental nonsense" of Cardozo and
Brandeis.
When is a Corporation?
Having disposed of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. and the New York
Court of Appeals, Cohen moves on to point out the "transcendental
nonsense" of the United States Supreme Court in its decision of the
famous case, United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co.1
This case presented the question whether coal companies whose business
had been injuriously affected in the course of a strike could reach the
funds of the labor unions which had encouraged the strike or whether
legal action should be confined to the particular individuals charged with
committing or inducing the injury. The Court decided: (1) that unincorporated labor unions, such as the United Mline Workers of America,
are recognized as distinct entities, suable as such for torts committed
by them in the course of strikes, and their strike-funds are subject to
execution; (2) that the national union is not responsible for local strikes
committed without its sanction; (3) that the district union, a subdivision
of the national body, is responsible for injuries unlawfully inflicted during authorized strikes and that its strike-funds may be subjected to a
119.
120.

ROBINSON,

oc. cit. supra

259 U. S. 344 (1922).

note 2.
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resulting judgment; and (4) that the strike therein involved was not a
conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce within the' Sherman Act.
Cohen proceeds to "functionalize" the decision and to inform us (1)
how the Supreme Court should have decided the case and (2) how
Charles B. Hughes, of counsel for the labor union, should have framed
his brief The errors committed by Hughes and his 'associates are as
follows:
"So far as appears from the printed record, counsel for the union defendants
did not attempt to show that labor unions would be seriously handicapped by
the imposition of financial responsibility for damage done in strikes, that It
would be impossible for labor unions to control agents provocateurs, and that
labor unions served a very important function in modern industrial society
which would be seriously endangered by the type of liability in question. Instead-of offering any such argument to support the claini of the labor union
to legal immunity for the torts of its members, counsel for the union advanced
the metaphysical argument that a-labor union, being an unincorporated association, is not a person and, therefore, cannot be subject to tort liability."'-'
Despite the fact that the labor unions, both national and district, won
a fairly complete victory in this case, 12 2 it seems that Hughes (like
Cardozo in the Tauza case) used the wrong words in his'successful defense.' H ought t9 have talked about "functions" and "handicaps" and
"agents Provocat'eurs" and thereby have stirred the Supreme Court emotionally by the use of non-legal, economic, industrial, and sociological
data and statistics. Instead, Hughes committed the grievous error of
considering the law and the decisions of the Supreme Court-seemingly
a:very ieinous offense in the primer of functionalism. Hughes, let it
be n6ted, was 'appearing in the Coronado case as a lawyer, not as a
phil6sopher or'as i reformer. His single task was to frame a brief that
would 'onvin~e the court and he very naturally referred to the procedural
obstacles concededly existing at common law' 23 in the bringing of actions
against unincorporated associations. True, the technical point was decided against the labor'union but the reading of the opinion will disclose
that it is highly pioblematical whether the suggested discussion about
121. Cohen, at 813.
The brief of the labor unions was not confined to the single point that the labor union
was an unincorporated association. The brief contains eight points. One of these points,
to the effect that the defendant labor unions were not liable in this suit under the Shermai
Act, was accepted by the Supreme Court and resulted in a reversal of the judgment against
the defendant unions.
- 122.' The Court, while deciding that labor unions, though unincorporated, can be sued
under the Sherman Act, held that the ,particular strike in question did not constitute a
conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce within the Act.
123. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 385 (1922).
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functions and handicaps of labor unions would have altered the Court's
conclusion. 24
Moreover, it is submitted, that Hughes approached the preparation
of his brief in true realistic fashion according to Cohen's own formulaand is blamed for doing it. Hughes was concerned "with the actual behavior of the courts",' 2' in this instance, the actual behavior of the
Supreme Court evidenced by their past decisions. As Cohen states it:
"The question what the courts ought to do is irrelevant here"120 [in the
preparation of the lawyer's case]. Yet in his attack upon the brief
of the labor unions in the Coronado case the critic berates counsel for not
building their brief around arguments about functions and handicaps,
omitting or minimizing basic legal questions. To stress a program emphasizing strict adherence to the law "as is" and then to scold an advocate who follows this very formula is seemingly inconsistent if not nonsensical.
The "Word-Magic" of Functionalism
Next Cohen proceeds to show wherein the Supreme Court departed
from the true functional approach:
"The Supreme
essential aspects,
union is a person
a person in law,
sued.' ,7127

Court argued, 'A labor union can be sued because it is, in
a person, a quasi-corporation.' The realist will say, 'A labor
or quasi-corporation because it can be sued; to call something
is merely to state, in metaphorical language, that it can be

To the casual reader not versed in the refinements of functional terminology, this verbal distinction seems strikingly like the hodge-podge and
word-magic charged so frequently against the logicians and the theoWhat is the difference between the "transreticians of the law.'2
cendental" argument of the Supreme Court in the Coronado case that
"a labor union can be sued because it is ... a person" and the realistic
statement that "a labor union is a person ...

because it can be sued"?

The scientific explanation of "the significant difference" between the
two modes of expression is as follows:
"If we say that a court acts in a certain way 'because a labor union is a
person,' we appear to justify the court's action, and to justify that action,
moreover, in transcendental terms, by asserting something that sounds like a
proposition but which can not be confirmed or refutcd by positive evidence or
by ethical argument. If, on the other hand, we say that a labor union is a
124. See infra notes 131-135.
125. Cohen, at 839.
126. Ibid.
127. Id. at 813.
128. FRnrl, op. cit. supra note 3, at 57-68.
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person 'because the courts allow it to be sued,' we recognize that the action of
the courts has not been justified at all, and that the question of whether the
action of the courts is justifiable calls for an answer in non-legal terms. To
legal rules in purely legal terms is always to argue in a
justify or criticize
'12
vicious circle.
His contention is, therefore, that the Supreme Court smothered and
prevented the consideration of "positive evidence," "ethical argument,"
and "non-legal" factors by arguing that "a labor union can be sued
because it is . . . a person." Here, and elsewhere,"' the critic of legal
concepts is contending that the use of concepts (like corporation, contract and property) blankets and stifles the evaluation of the practicability, justice and soundness of the stated precept or principle in actual
operation.
An excellent proving-ground exists to test the validity of the complaint that the Supreme Court was prevented from weighing non-legal
facts by reason of the metaphysical terms used in the opinion. That
proving-ground is the Coronado case itself. A reading of the decision
discloses that the Supreme Court did the very thing which Cohen says
is barred by reason of the Court's transcendental approach to the
question at issue. The judges meticulously traced the nature, extent,
functions and powers of the United Mine Workers' 'international union.
They showed the centralization of control in the union's president, the
unity of the organization and its financial resources leading to the conclusion that "no organized corporation has greater unity of action, and
in none is more power centered in the governing executive bodies. 1 31
Having shown the "institution" and "functions" of the United Mine
Workers of America, the opinion frankly admits that at common law
unincorporated associations of this type could not be sued as separate
entities.' 32 But the Supreme Court refused to follow the "bankrupt"
concept. Then follows this striking passage:
"But the growth and necessities of these great labor organizations have
brought affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness and provisions for their protection, which their members have found necessary. Their
right to maintain strikes, when they do not violate law or the rights of others,
has been declared. The embezzlement of funds by their officers has been
especially denounced as crime. The so-called union label, which is a quasi
trademark to indicate the origin of manufactured product in union labor, has
been protected against pirating and deceptive use by the statutes of most of
the States, and in many States authority to sue to enjoin its use has been con129.

Cohen, at 814.

130.

Id. at 809-820.

(italics in original text.)

131. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344. 383-385
(1922).
132. Id. at 385.
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ferred on unions. They have been given distinct and separate representations
union interests in statutory arbitrations,
and the right to appear to represent
33
and before official labor boards."'
After listing the favorable legislation which has been enacted on behalf of labor unions and after stressing the "modern needs" which require
a change in procedure applicable to unincorporated associations,""4 the
Court states the ethical grounds justifying it in reversing the common
law rule governing service upon unincorporated associations:
"It would be unfortunate if an organization with as great power as this
International Union has in the raising of large funds and in directing the conduct of four hundred thousand members in carrying on, in a wide territory,
industrial controversies and strikes, out of which so much unlawful injury to
private rights is possible, could assemble its assets to be used therein free from
liability for injuries by torts committed in course of such strikes. To remand
persons injured to a suit against each of the 400,000 members to recover
damages and to levy on his share of the strike fund, would be to leave them
remediless."' 35

Concluding the consideration of the Coronado case, two significant
points may be noted: (1) The Coronado case, offered as a sample of
transcendental nonsense, is in fact a decision in which the Supreme Court
rejected the rule of the common law that an unincorporated association
cannot be sued as a distinct entity. 30 In place of this outmoded formula
the Supreme Court set up a new procedural rule (or concept) which
established the suability of unincorporated labor unions and the right
to seize their strike-funds for unlawful injuries inflicted during the
course of an authorized strike. (2) The Supreme Court established this
new "concept" following an exhaustive coverage of the "handicaps"
which resulted from the former rule, after due consideration of the
"functions" which labor unions perform in our social order, and mindful
of the "advantages" bestowed on labor unions by legislation and of
the "ethical" considerations justifying a departure from the ancient rule
of procedure.
In the selection of the Coronado case the functional critic has picked,
it would seem, a case which stands out not as an instance of dry-as-dust
formalism but rather as a pertinent example of the flexibility of traditional law ready and able to adjust the "rules" and "principles" to fit the
needs and emergencies of our day and place.
In his exhaustive and unique analysis of the Tauza'3 7 and Coronado'8
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 385-386.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 388-3S9.
WRGHnTGTOx, U.NwCORPoATm ASsociA 0.1S (2d ed. 1923) 70.
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
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cases, Cohen discloses his adherence to the "recent cult of the single
decision",1 8 ' a. cult which stresses the individualization of juristic thought,
the emphasis upon facts, functions and purposes, and the abandonment
of concepts, rules and principles. In this battle between function and
concept, between the single decision and the train of precedents, one
pauses to consider the outcome. Functionalism already claims that victory is in its grasp; that classical law is in retreat; 140 that the "'Restate.
ment of the Law' by the American Law Institute is the last long-drawn.
out gasp of a dying tradition".' 4 '
It may not be impertinent to set down the contrasted views of Dean
Pound, a distinguished critic of realism, 42 as to the permanency of this
new cult:
"As to the recent cult of the single decision, I take that to be in jurisprudence
what philosophical anarchy is in politics. Indeed, it is like philosophical anarchy or, anarchist individualism, as it might better be called, an outgrowth of
the economic realism of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Like the
latter, it makes confident pretensions to a peculiar or even exclusive touch with
43
reality.')
Then follows this significant prediction violently contradicting the glowing promise of functionalism:
the cult of the single decision is one of the last gasps of the over1 44
individualist thinking of the nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurist."
Whether the contrasted view of Cohen or Pound regarding the vitality
of the new cult ultimately prevails, caution should impel the functionalist to postpone the obituary notice of the "transcendental approach"
until a remote date in the future; to announce the death of traditional
law at the moment might be termed "functional nonsense".
[To be concluded]
139. Pound, How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values in Twentieth-Century
Juristic Thought? (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 81, 89.
140. See p. 285, supra.
141. Cohen, at 833.

142. Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L. Ra'. 697; Pound,
Law and the Science of Law in Recent Theories (1934) 7 Am. L. ScHooL Rv. 1057.
143. Pound, supra note 139, at 89.
144.

Id. at 90.
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